Why on earth did the government personnel choose to walk out at the mere suggestion that the virus could be created by humans ?
Even more bizarre was the applause for the walkout.
American citizens must learn to accept the fact that SARS-CoV was created by their own very distinguished scientists, just as the more than 150 nuclear weapons held by Pakistan were funded and overseen by successive US presidents and administrations.
This raises the question: will the FBI conduct a thorough and logical investigation into the virus's origins? The truth will not be startling but most certainly embarrassing.
Frank Sweeny's US lab origin analogy is the nuclear bomb built in New Mexico but dropped in Japan. Mine was the biobomb from Montana that exploded in Wuhan. I didn't know about Pakistan's atomic history; ironically, China was involved.
China is definitely involved , but the US has not only funded and armed just about every Pakistani terror group, but ensured Pakistan had a robust military nuclear programme aimed officially and specifically at India.
Anyway, the pathogen was fertilised and weaponised in UNC and RML.
The UNC/NIAID-Munster/China scenario is in more perspectives similar to the NYT Pakistan atomic bomb narratve.
In short:
Munster 'stole' Fouchier's virus transmission technology that finally produced the animal vaccine, 'tested' in China.
The New York Times article from June 1, 1998, titled "U.S. and China Helped Pakistan Build Its Bomb," provides a detailed account of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development, emphasizing the roles of China, the United States, and covert technology acquisition. Below, I analyze how the stealing of nuclear technology by Abdul Qadeer Khan at the Twente Technical University in the Netherlands fits into the article’s narrative, focusing on timing, impact, and the roles of the Netherlands, China, and the U.S. in Pakistan’s atomic bomb development.
Timing of Khan’s Actions
The article does not explicitly mention Twente Technical University but refers to Abdul Qadeer Khan’s role in acquiring nuclear technology through espionage. Khan, a Pakistani metallurgist, worked at the Physics Dynamics Research Laboratory (FDO), a subcontractor to the Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland (UCN) facility in Almelo, Netherlands, which was part of the URENCO consortium, in the early 1970s. While studying at Twente Technical University for his doctorate (completed in 1972), Khan gained access to sensitive centrifuge technology information through his subsequent work at FDO. The article notes that Pakistan’s nuclear efforts intensified after its 1971 defeat in the war with India, with Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ordering the development of a nuclear bomb in January 1972. Khan’s theft of centrifuge designs occurred shortly thereafter, likely between 1972 and 1975, when he returned to Pakistan with the blueprints. This timing aligns with the article’s mention of Pakistan’s resolve to build a bomb in the early 1970s, leveraging stolen technology to accelerate its uranium enrichment program.
Impact of Khan’s Theft
Khan’s acquisition of gas centrifuge technology from URENCO was pivotal for Pakistan’s nuclear program. The article highlights that Pakistan, one of the world’s poorest countries at the time, relied on a “global network of theft and espionage” to achieve its nuclear ambitions. Khan’s stolen designs enabled Pakistan to develop uranium enrichment capabilities, a critical step for producing weapons-grade uranium. The article underscores that this technology, combined with Chinese assistance, allowed Pakistan to conduct its first nuclear tests on May 28, 1998, in response to India’s tests earlier that month. The impact of Khan’s actions was profound: without the centrifuge technology, Pakistan’s path to nuclear capability would have been significantly delayed or unattainable, given its limited industrial and scientific infrastructure.
Roles of the Netherlands, China, and the U.S.
Netherlands: The Netherlands played an inadvertent but critical role through Khan’s espionage. The article does not directly name the Netherlands but implies its significance by referencing the “global network” of technology theft. Khan’s access to URENCO’s centrifuge designs, facilitated by lax security at the Dutch facility, provided Pakistan with the technical foundation for uranium enrichment. Dutch investigations later confirmed Khan’s theft, and posts on X note that this technology was referred to as “the Dutch method” in Pakistan’s nuclear program. The Netherlands’ role was thus crucial as the source of the stolen technology that jumpstarted Pakistan’s enrichment efforts.
China: The article explicitly states that Pakistan’s nuclear success “could not have happened without smuggled Chinese technology.” China provided Pakistan with nuclear warhead designs and possibly highly enriched uranium or plutonium, significantly advancing Pakistan’s ability to produce a functional bomb. This assistance began in the 1980s, complementing Khan’s stolen centrifuge technology, which focused on uranium enrichment. The article suggests that China’s support was motivated by strategic interests, particularly to counterbalance India, a regional rival.
United States: The U.S. played a complex and contradictory role, as outlined in the article. Under the “Atoms for Peace” program in the 1950s, the U.S. trained Pakistani scientists in nuclear reactor technology and provided Pakistan’s first research reactor and fuel, inadvertently building its early nuclear expertise. However, U.S. policy later shifted to nonproliferation, with sanctions and restrictions on Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s to curb its nuclear ambitions. The article quotes Nicholas Platt, former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, stating that U.S. policies denying Pakistan a “credible conventional capability” pushed it to rely on nuclear deterrence. Thus, early U.S. support indirectly enabled Pakistan’s nuclear foundation, while later restrictions may have incentivized its covert pursuit of the bomb.
Importance of the Three Countries
The interplay of the Netherlands, China, and the U.S. was essential to Pakistan’s nuclear success:
Netherlands: Provided the critical centrifuge technology through Khan’s theft, enabling uranium enrichment.
China: Supplied warhead designs and materials, bridging the gap between enrichment and weaponization.
U.S.: Contributed early nuclear training and technology, later shaping Pakistan’s strategic calculus through military restrictions.
Together, these contributions—intentional and unintentional—enabled Pakistan to overcome its resource constraints and achieve nuclear status by 1998. The article underscores that Pakistan’s bomb was a product of both opportunistic espionage (via the Netherlands) and strategic partnerships (with China), against the backdrop of inconsistent U.S. policies.
Conclusion
Abdul Qadeer Khan’s theft of nuclear centrifuge technology from the Netherlands, facilitated by his time at Twente Technical University and work at URENCO, was a foundational event in Pakistan’s nuclear journey, as implied in the NYT article. Occurring in the early 1970s, it provided the technical know-how for uranium enrichment, which, when combined with Chinese warhead designs and early U.S. nuclear training, culminated in Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests. The Netherlands was the unwitting source of critical technology, China the deliberate enabler of weaponization, and the U.S. an early facilitator and later adversary, shaping Pakistan’s nuclear path through both support and obstruction.
Why on earth did the government personnel choose to walk out at the mere suggestion that the virus could be created by humans ?
Even more bizarre was the applause for the walkout.
American citizens must learn to accept the fact that SARS-CoV was created by their own very distinguished scientists, just as the more than 150 nuclear weapons held by Pakistan were funded and overseen by successive US presidents and administrations.
This raises the question: will the FBI conduct a thorough and logical investigation into the virus's origins? The truth will not be startling but most certainly embarrassing.
Frank Sweeny's US lab origin analogy is the nuclear bomb built in New Mexico but dropped in Japan. Mine was the biobomb from Montana that exploded in Wuhan. I didn't know about Pakistan's atomic history; ironically, China was involved.
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/060198pakistan-nuke-history.html
Jim, I would never trust the NYT.
China is definitely involved , but the US has not only funded and armed just about every Pakistani terror group, but ensured Pakistan had a robust military nuclear programme aimed officially and specifically at India.
Anyway, the pathogen was fertilised and weaponised in UNC and RML.
The UNC/NIAID-Munster/China scenario is in more perspectives similar to the NYT Pakistan atomic bomb narratve.
In short:
Munster 'stole' Fouchier's virus transmission technology that finally produced the animal vaccine, 'tested' in China.
The New York Times article from June 1, 1998, titled "U.S. and China Helped Pakistan Build Its Bomb," provides a detailed account of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development, emphasizing the roles of China, the United States, and covert technology acquisition. Below, I analyze how the stealing of nuclear technology by Abdul Qadeer Khan at the Twente Technical University in the Netherlands fits into the article’s narrative, focusing on timing, impact, and the roles of the Netherlands, China, and the U.S. in Pakistan’s atomic bomb development.
Timing of Khan’s Actions
The article does not explicitly mention Twente Technical University but refers to Abdul Qadeer Khan’s role in acquiring nuclear technology through espionage. Khan, a Pakistani metallurgist, worked at the Physics Dynamics Research Laboratory (FDO), a subcontractor to the Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland (UCN) facility in Almelo, Netherlands, which was part of the URENCO consortium, in the early 1970s. While studying at Twente Technical University for his doctorate (completed in 1972), Khan gained access to sensitive centrifuge technology information through his subsequent work at FDO. The article notes that Pakistan’s nuclear efforts intensified after its 1971 defeat in the war with India, with Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ordering the development of a nuclear bomb in January 1972. Khan’s theft of centrifuge designs occurred shortly thereafter, likely between 1972 and 1975, when he returned to Pakistan with the blueprints. This timing aligns with the article’s mention of Pakistan’s resolve to build a bomb in the early 1970s, leveraging stolen technology to accelerate its uranium enrichment program.
Impact of Khan’s Theft
Khan’s acquisition of gas centrifuge technology from URENCO was pivotal for Pakistan’s nuclear program. The article highlights that Pakistan, one of the world’s poorest countries at the time, relied on a “global network of theft and espionage” to achieve its nuclear ambitions. Khan’s stolen designs enabled Pakistan to develop uranium enrichment capabilities, a critical step for producing weapons-grade uranium. The article underscores that this technology, combined with Chinese assistance, allowed Pakistan to conduct its first nuclear tests on May 28, 1998, in response to India’s tests earlier that month. The impact of Khan’s actions was profound: without the centrifuge technology, Pakistan’s path to nuclear capability would have been significantly delayed or unattainable, given its limited industrial and scientific infrastructure.
Roles of the Netherlands, China, and the U.S.
Netherlands: The Netherlands played an inadvertent but critical role through Khan’s espionage. The article does not directly name the Netherlands but implies its significance by referencing the “global network” of technology theft. Khan’s access to URENCO’s centrifuge designs, facilitated by lax security at the Dutch facility, provided Pakistan with the technical foundation for uranium enrichment. Dutch investigations later confirmed Khan’s theft, and posts on X note that this technology was referred to as “the Dutch method” in Pakistan’s nuclear program. The Netherlands’ role was thus crucial as the source of the stolen technology that jumpstarted Pakistan’s enrichment efforts.
China: The article explicitly states that Pakistan’s nuclear success “could not have happened without smuggled Chinese technology.” China provided Pakistan with nuclear warhead designs and possibly highly enriched uranium or plutonium, significantly advancing Pakistan’s ability to produce a functional bomb. This assistance began in the 1980s, complementing Khan’s stolen centrifuge technology, which focused on uranium enrichment. The article suggests that China’s support was motivated by strategic interests, particularly to counterbalance India, a regional rival.
United States: The U.S. played a complex and contradictory role, as outlined in the article. Under the “Atoms for Peace” program in the 1950s, the U.S. trained Pakistani scientists in nuclear reactor technology and provided Pakistan’s first research reactor and fuel, inadvertently building its early nuclear expertise. However, U.S. policy later shifted to nonproliferation, with sanctions and restrictions on Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s to curb its nuclear ambitions. The article quotes Nicholas Platt, former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, stating that U.S. policies denying Pakistan a “credible conventional capability” pushed it to rely on nuclear deterrence. Thus, early U.S. support indirectly enabled Pakistan’s nuclear foundation, while later restrictions may have incentivized its covert pursuit of the bomb.
Importance of the Three Countries
The interplay of the Netherlands, China, and the U.S. was essential to Pakistan’s nuclear success:
Netherlands: Provided the critical centrifuge technology through Khan’s theft, enabling uranium enrichment.
China: Supplied warhead designs and materials, bridging the gap between enrichment and weaponization.
U.S.: Contributed early nuclear training and technology, later shaping Pakistan’s strategic calculus through military restrictions.
Together, these contributions—intentional and unintentional—enabled Pakistan to overcome its resource constraints and achieve nuclear status by 1998. The article underscores that Pakistan’s bomb was a product of both opportunistic espionage (via the Netherlands) and strategic partnerships (with China), against the backdrop of inconsistent U.S. policies.
Conclusion
Abdul Qadeer Khan’s theft of nuclear centrifuge technology from the Netherlands, facilitated by his time at Twente Technical University and work at URENCO, was a foundational event in Pakistan’s nuclear journey, as implied in the NYT article. Occurring in the early 1970s, it provided the technical know-how for uranium enrichment, which, when combined with Chinese warhead designs and early U.S. nuclear training, culminated in Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests. The Netherlands was the unwitting source of critical technology, China the deliberate enabler of weaponization, and the U.S. an early facilitator and later adversary, shaping Pakistan’s nuclear path through both support and obstruction.
Interesting irony since the Netherlands doesn't have an atomic bomb.
Yes, the irony is that the Dutch work under the umbrella of the US/NATO.
The Dutch store US cruise missiles, probably including atomic load.
Btw pandemic response is organised by NATO too...
I would recommend that you read a book provides a detailed account of the complicity of the US in the Pakistani nuclear programme development.
" Deception: Pakistan, the United States , and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons."
An article in the NYT is quite inadequate as a reference.
Sounds like Charlie Wilson's War stuff: the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Pakistan hiding bin Laden from the US military is ironic:
https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v37/n10/seymour-m.-hersh/the-killing-of-osama-bin-laden